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Introduction 
 
Between 1960 and 2008, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been characterized by a weak growth 
performance and a high and persistent dependence on natural resources.  During this period, per-
capita GDP in SSA has grown at an average annual rate of 0.74%.1 Over the same period of time, 
the ratio of natural resource exports to total merchandise exports in SSA has only marginally 
declined from an initial 77% to the current 65.1%2
 
. As of 2006, the ratio in SSA is about 16 
percentage points higher than the average observed for the group of low income countries and 28 
points higher than the average of the group of middle income countries. Is there any causality 
nexus between these two facts? In this paper we try to answer this question. More specifically, 
we study whether natural resources are the cause (or one of the causes) of underdevelopment of 
SSA. 
Hints to answering this question may come from two separate strands of the literature. The first 
strand investigates the natural resource curse hypothesis. Sachs and Warner (1995 and 2001) 
empirically show that a higher dependence on natural resources reduces subsequent economic 
growth in a large cross section of countries.3
                                                 
1  This compares with an average growth rate of 2.78% in South Asia, 1.83% in Latin America, 5.47% in East Asia, 
and 1.67% in the group of low income economies. 
  However, recent contributions challenge the 
conventional wisdom on the resource curse. The findings reported by Stijns (2005), 
Brunnschweiler (2008), and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) suggest that the negative effect of 
2 The comparison with other developing regions is again quite striking: the ratio of resource exports to total exports 
has decreased from 88.1% to 42.8% in Latin America, from 57.9% to 23.7% in South Asia, and from 49.5% to 
19.2% in East Asia. 
3 Theoretical rationalizations of this negative effect can be found in Gylfason and Zoega (2003) and Eliasson and 
Turnovsky (2004) while Leite and Weidmann (1999), Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2005), Bulte et al. (2005) and 
Isham et al. (2005) provide further empirical support to the curse hypothesis. A related branch of the literature 
studies how the presence and exploitation of resources matters for the occurrence of conflict (which is in turn 
detrimental to growth), see for instance Humphreys (2005), Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009), and Schollaert and 
Van de gaer (2009). 
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natural resources on growth is not robust to changes in the specification of the regression model 
and/or the empirical measurement of resources. Furthermore, Mehlum et al. (2006), Snyder 
(2006), and Boschini et al. (2007) provide evidence that natural resources are not a curse per se, 
but that their effect on growth is conditional on the quality of underlying institutions.4
 
 Alexeev 
and Conrad (2009) emphasize the importance of “level effects” of natural resources and provide 
evidence that a large endowment of oil and other mineral resources has a positive effect on the 
level of per-capita GDP in the long-term. They also show that oil and minerals are largely neutral 
with respect to the quality of the countries’ institutions. In a recent contribution, Norman (2009) 
finds that larger initial natural resource stocks reduce the levels of rule of law and do not affect 
growth directly, while raw resource exports do not significantly affect the role of law but do 
affect average growth rates. All in all, the jury is still out on the case of whether natural resources 
are bad for growth or not.  
The second relevant strand of the literature is concerned directly with the explanation of Africa’s 
growth tragedy. The general idea underlying this research is that Africa is deficient in most of the 
key determinants of growth, such as openness to international trade, human capital (education 
and health), and public infrastructures. Easterly and Levine (1997) suggest that this deficiency is 
due to the high degree of ethnic fragmentation that characterizes the continent. Collier and 
Gunning (1999) point to institutional weaknesses as the main reason why Africa lacks the key 
growth drivers. Following the argument originally advanced by Acemoglu et al. (2001), Nunn 
(2007) traces the cause of bad institutions back to colonial rule and slave trade. The high 
mortality due to high malaria incidence is also regarded as a major obstacle to growth and 
                                                 
4 Along similar lines, Hodler (2006) argues that natural resources lower incomes in ethnically fractionalized 
countries, but increase income in homogenous countries. 
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development in Africa (Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Bhattacharyya (2009)). Sachs and Warner 
(1997) also emphasize the role of geography, which includes exposure to malaria and other 
diseases as well as the tendency to develop a high dependence on natural resources. Artadi and 
Sala-i-Martin (2003) take a number of robust determinants of growth and show that with respect 
to almost each of them African performs significantly worse than the other developing regions.  
 
We bring these two strands of the literature together in an attempt to shed new light on the 
relevance of the curse hypothesis within the African context. Our methodological framework is a 
standard growth regression (see Section 2 below). We specify the r.h.s. of the regression to (i) 
allow the effect of natural resources to be different between SSA and the rest of the world (ROW) 
and to (ii) understand why natural resources are (eventually) a curse in SSA but not elsewhere. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, SSA does suffer from the resource curse 
while the rest of the world does not. This differential effect, which we refer to as the “SSA 
specificity”, mostly arises from the negative growth-effect that fuels and base metals have in 
SSA. One can see in this result an extension of the hypothesis that natural resources are not a 
curse per-se, but rather that they are a curse depending upon some other initial conditions of the 
economy. Second, only few of the commodities that characterize the structure of production and 
export specialization of SSA seem to be intrinsically bad for growth in the sense that they 
significantly increase economy’s exposure to growth-reducing terms of trade shocks. Third, 
institutional development affects the extent to which the relationship between natural resources 
and growth differs between SSA and the rest of the world. In fact, once the interaction between 
natural resources and institutions is explicitly modeled, the SSA specificity vanishes.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic regression framework 
and the differential role of natural resources in SSA and in the rest of the world. Section 3 links 
the peculiar pattern of specialization of SSA to terms of trade effects. Section 4 looks at the 
interaction between natural resources and institutions. Section 5 provides some additional 
evidence on the robustness of the main results of the paper. The appendix contains the description 
of variables, a full list of data sources, and statistics on the relevance of the instruments used in 
the econometric analysis. 
 
1. Searching for a curse 
1.1 Econometric model 
 
The econometric analysis in this paper makes use of a standard growth regression framework of 
the type: 
 
(1)   itititnnitit zxxg εβααα +++++= ,,110 ..  
 
where g is the growth rate of per-capita GDP period over period t in generic country i, xk (with k 
= 1, 2…n) is a set of control variables, z is an indicator of resource dependence, ε is a random 
disturbance, and the αs and β are parameters to be estimated. To capture long-term effects, and 
coherently with much of the growth literature, data are averaged over sub-periods of five year 
each. The period of observation is 1975-2004. The full sample includes up to 109 countries (see 
Appendix for a list). 
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The methodological difficulties in estimating equation (1) are well-known. The first hurdle is the 
choice of control variables. In the voluminous literature on growth empirics, up to 70 variables 
have been used on the r.h.s. of equation (1). Given the impossibility of using all of them 
simultaneously, one is left with a close to infinite number of combinations of subsets. The 
feasible strategy is to select a number of controls on the basis of theoretical considerations and 
then test for the sensitivity of the results to changes in the basic specification of the model. In line 
with this approach, the following variables are used as controls: (i) the lagged value of per-capita 
GDP to account for the relative convergence hypothesis, (ii) average inflation rate and 
government consumption to GDP ratio to account for the macroeconomic policy stance, (iii) the 
enrollment rate in secondary schooling to proxy for the impact of human capital accumulation, 
(iv) an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization and the absolute geographical latitude of 
countries to capture country-fixed effects that previous research has shown to be important 
determinants of growth in the least developed countries, (v) the ratio of exports and imports to 
GDP to measure the degree of country’s trade integration with the rest of the world, and  (vi) time 
dummies to account for time-specific effects.  
 
The second major problem in the estimation of equation (1) concerns the choice of the estimator. 
In order to address the issues of endogeneity and correlated individual effects that make standard 
Ordinary Least Squares inappropriate, Caselli et al. (1996) propose to estimate the growth 
regression with a variant of the Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) of Arellano and Bond 
(1991). With this estimator, the growth regression is first transformed in a dynamic model of the 
level of per-capita GDP. The transformed model is then first-differenced to eliminate the bias 
arising from individual heterogeneity and estimated using all lagged values of the regressors as 
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instruments. However, given that the basic specification chosen for model (1) also includes time-
invariant country fixed effects, we opt for a standard two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator, 
which can in fact be regarded as a special case of GMM estimator for dynamic panels. The 
endogenous variables in model (1)5 are instrumented using their one period-lagged value (as the  
data are five period averages, the observation in 1970-74 is used to instrument the observation in 
1975-79: the observation in 1975-79 is used as instrument of the observation in 1980-1984, and 
so on). In order to strengthen the set of instruments and increase the number of over-identifying 
restrictions, legal origin dummies are added to the group of lagged variables (see La Porta et al. 
(1999) for the underlying rationale). This also allows controlling for some possible residual 
endogeneity of lagged income6
 
.  
The final methodological issue concerns the measurement of resource dependence. Sachs and 
Warner (1995) suggest using the share of exports of natural resources in GDP while Sala-i-
Martin and Subramanian (2003) extend this to include the share of the exports of four types of 
natural resources – fuels, ores and metals (base metals), agricultural raw materials and food. This 
is indeed a measure of resource dependence. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) stress that 
resource dependence is different from resource abundance, defined as the log of total natural 
capital and mineral resource assets in dollars per-capita. Data on resource abundance are however 
available for two years only (1994 and 2000) and for a relatively small number of African 
                                                 
5 Inflation, government consumption, school enrollment, trade openness.  
6 We use the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions to assess the exogeneity of our instruments. This statistic is 
reported at the bottom of the table with the regression results. The null hypothesis that the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid can never be rejected at usual confidence levels. In the Appendix we also show some measures 
of the goodness of fit of the first stage regression in order to assess the relevance of the instruments. 
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countries (see World Bank 1997 and 2006). We therefore use a measure of resource dependence 
in our baseline estimates.  
  
As some of these methodological choices are admittedly controversial, in Section 5 we will run a 
number of robustness checks using alternative instruments, different estimators, and a measure of 
resource abundance instead of one of resource dependence. 
 
2.2   Growth and dependence on primary commodities 
 
The basic findings concerning the curse of natural resources are reported in Table 1. Column I of 
the table shows the basic growth regression without the indicator of resource dependence. All of 
the control variables, with the only exception of the inflation rate, are statistically significant and 
display the expected sign. The rate of relative convergence is lower than that reported in Barro 
and Lee (1994), but still different from zero, thus implying that initially poorer economies grow 
faster. A larger government, represented by higher values of the government consumption to 
GDP ratio, reduces growth most likely because it implies greater nonproductive public 
expenditure and taxation. The positive coefficient on school enrollment reflects the positive direct 
impact of human capital formation on growth.. The country fixed effects indicate that more 
ethnically fractionalized countries grow less, probably because of their intrinsically greater 
sociopolitical instability, and that geographical location does matter in the process of economic 
development. Greater openness to international trade appears to promote faster growth. Finally, a 
noteworthy feature of this basic specification in column I is that it is able to explain much of the 
difference in growth performance between SSA and rest of the world. Indeed, a regional dummy 
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taking value 1 for SSA countries is included among the regressors, but its coefficient is 
statistically insignificant (coefficient is –0.009 with a p-value of 0.14).  
 
Table 1: Growth and dependence on primary commodities 
 
 I II III IV V VI VI 
 
Lagged income per-capita 
 
-0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
Inflation 
 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
Government consumption 
 
-0.072*** -0.070*** -0.064*** -0.077*** -0.075*** -0.087*** -0.110*** 
School enrollment 
 
0.041*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.049*** 
Latitude 
 
0.049*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 
Ethnic fragmentation 
 
-0.010*** -0.010*** -0.007** -0.009** -0.005** -0.005** -0.003** 
Trade openness 
 
0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
Primary commodities 
 
 -0.004      
Prim commodities * SSA 
 
  -0.007**     
Prim commodities*(1-SSA) 
 
  -0.003     
Agricultural mat. * SSA 
 
   0.005    
Agricultural mat  
 
   -0.004    
Food * SSA 
 
    -0.010   
Food  
 
    0.000   
Fuels * SSA 
 
     -0.037***  
Fuels  
 
     0.005  
Ores and metals * SSA 
 
      -0.065*** 
Ores and metals  
 
 
      0.004 
Number of observation 
 
283 256 256 258 258 256 258 
Sargan Test 2.92 5.96 5.81 4.04 5.04 4.09 2.89 
Notes: SSA denotes the dummy variable taking value 1 for Sub-Saharan Countries. For full description of variables see Appendix. 
Time dummies and constant not reported. Column I also include the SSA dummy separately: its estimated coefficient is –0.009 with 
a p-value of 0.14. The raw Sargan test reports the J-statistic for the test of over-identifying restrictions. *, **, *** respectively denote 
significance of coefficients at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of confidence. 
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The model in column II includes the measure of resource dependence. Its coefficient turns out to 
be negative but not different from zero at usual confidence levels. This means that after 
controlling for other determinants of growth, the growth-reducing effect of natural resources is 
negligible. That is, in the global sample there is no statistical evidence of a natural resource curse.  
 
In order to test for a possible differential effect of primary commodities in SSA relative to the rest 
of the world, a slightly amended growth specification is estimated: 
 
(2)   ititititnnitit dSSAzdSSAzxxg εββααα +−+++++= )1(.. 21,,110  
 
where dSSA is the dummy variable taking value if country i is in Sub-Saharan Africa. All the 
other variables and parameters are the same as in equation (1). In equation (2) the relationship 
between primary commodities and growth is allowed to have different slope in SSA relative to 
the rest of the world. 
 
The estimates of equation (2) are displayed in column III of Table 1. Natural resources seem to 
reduce growth in Africa, but not in the rest of the world. In fact, both β1 and β2 are negative (-
0.010 and –0.004 respectively), but only β1 is statistically different from zero at usual confidence 
levels. Thus, for the average SSA country, the marginal impact of natural resources on growth is 
negative. For the average country in the rest of the world, instead, the marginal impact of natural 
resources on growth is negligible. The remaining columns in the table show estimates of equation 
(2) for disaggregated categories of primary commodities. It turns out that fuels (Column VI) and 
ores and metals (Column VII) drive much of the negative growth-effect of resources in SSA. 
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Conversely, none of the four categories of primary commodity has any significant effect of 
growth in the rest of the world. 
 
The curse is therefore a SSA specificity. Why is then Sub-Saharan Africa afflicted by a curse 
while the rest of the world apparently is not? Our hypothesis is that SSA differs from the rest of 
the world with respect to some structural characteristics that are crucial in shaping the 
relationship between growth and resources. We identify two such characteristics. One is the 
pattern of specialization: within the broad category of primary commodities, SSA specializes in 
commodities that are not necessarily those in which the rest of the world specializes. The other is 
the level of institutional development: institutions in SSA are generally worse than in the rest of 
the world. The rest of the paper studies whether these differences in specialization patterns and 
institutional quality help explain the SSA specificity.  
 
2. The effect of specialization patterns 
 
The primary commodities in which SSA specializes are not necessarily the same in which the rest 
of the world specializes. Taking the year 2007 as a reference, out of the 10 primary commodities 
that were most exported worldwide, only three were among the 10 primary commodities most 
exported by SSA.7
                                                 
7 The statistic is confirmed by data from previous years. 
 The different pattern of specialization (reflected in a different structure of 
exports of natural resources) might therefore explain why SSA is found vulnerable to resource 
dependence while the rest of the world is not. To put it mildly, the hypothesis is that natural 
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resources are a curse in SSA just because, among the several possible primary commodities, SSA 
specializes on those that are intrinsically bad growth. 
 
To see how relevant this hypothesis might be, we re-run the regression equation (1) using export 
shares of individual commodities instead of the aggregate index of resource dependence. To 
make sure that the estimated coefficients picks the effect of individual commodities on the 
growth process and not some other effect due to other structural features of SSA, the regression is 
estimated on the sample of non SSA countries. Column I of Table 2 reports estimated coefficients 
for the ten primary commodities most exported by SSA.8
 
 It turns out that only three commodities 
appear to be bad for growth: cotton, coffee, and iron ores. Oil, cocoa, silver and coal instead 
appear to generate a positive growth effect. 
                                                 
8 Export shares of individual commodities are instrumented by their own lagged values. All controls and instruments 
are the same as in column II of Table 1. Estimated coefficients on the controls are not reported as they do not 
significantly differ from those reported in Table 1.  
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Table 2: Growth-yield and terms of trade effects of selected commodities 
 I 
Estimated coefficient in 
growth regression 
II 
Estimated coefficient in terms 
of trade regression 
 
Oil 
 
0.009** 0.099*** 
Cocoa 
 
1.626*** 0.104*** 
Cotton 
 
-0.276*** -0.038*** 
Coffee 
 
-0.108*** -0.107*** 
Fruits and nuts 
 
-0.008 0.034 
Sugar 
 
-0.032 -0.128* 
Silver 
 
1.160*** 0.019 
Iron ores 
 
-0.041** 0.086** 
Coal 
 
0.085*** -0.002 
Copper 
 
0.005 -0.111*** 
Notes:. Column I reports the estimated coefficient of the share of exports of each individual commodity in a growth 
regression estimated on the sample of non-African countries. Column II reports the estimated coefficient of the share of 
exports of each individual commodity in a terms of trade regression. *, **, *** respectively denote significance of 
coefficients at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of confidence. 
 
Why do different primary commodities have different effects on growth? We can think of two 
theoretical rationalizations. One draws on recent work on external economies of scale and 
comparative advantage (see for instance Ethier and Ruffin, 2009). If the production of a 
commodity is characterized by negative external economies of scale (due to, say, land 
overcrowding), the exporting country would suffer from a comparative cost disadvantage. 
Therefore, exporting that commodity would make the country worse off. In fact, to complete this 
explanation one would need to formalize why external diseconomies of scale occur, across 
countries, for some commodities and not others. This is potentially an interesting topic of future 
research. 
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The second explanation is probably more appealing at this stage and involves the link between 
dynamics of the terms of trade and patterns of specialization. As broadly documented in the 
literature, international prices of several commodities exhibit large swings and secular declining 
trends. This in turn affects the terms of trade of countries that export those commodities, thus 
opening up a channel of transmission from commodity specialization to growth (see Dehn, 2000 
and Blattman et al. 2007). The inclusion of the annual change in terms of trade as an explanatory 
variable in equation (1) confirms the empirical relevance of the terms of trade channel. Estimated 
coefficients are as follows (p-values in parenthesis; coefficient of time dummies are not 
reported):9
 
 
(3)   Growth =  0.051 –0.004*lagged GDP p.c. – 0.016*inflation – 0.014*gov consumpt + 
                         (0.00)   (0.00)                               (0.03)                  (0.62) 
 
+0.001*school enroll. +0.025*latitude –0.012*ethnic frag. + 0.001*trade + 
  (0.92)                           (0.05)                 (0.04)                        (0.42) 
 
+0.050*terms of trade growth 
  (0.000) 
Number of observations =159, Sargan test statistic = 1.13  
 
To check whether the selected primary commodities listed in Table 2 affect growth through terms 
of trade effects, the relationship between each commodity share of exports and average annual 
changes in terms of trade is estimated using the following regression: 
 
                                                 
9 The data on terms of trade growth are available for a shorter time series. This explains the smaller number of 
observations and some changes in the estimated coefficient on the other regressors. Interestingly, it seems that when 
changes in the terms of trade are accounted for, the residual impact of trade openness is negligible.  
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(4)   itititmmitit qwwtot υδγγγ ++++= ,,110 ...  
 
where tot is the growth of terms of trade in country i over time t, wj (j = 1….m) is a set of 
controls, q is the specific commodity share of total exports, υ is a random error and γs and δ are 
the parameters to be estimated. The choice of controls include: (i) secondary school enrollment 
and the capital formation ratio to GDP to account for factor accumulation and hence for the 
potential expansion of the country, (ii) per-capita GDP in percent of US per-capita GDP to 
account for the stage of economic development and hence the degree of product variety and 
quality, (iii) world GDP per-capita growth to reflect the dynamics of potential international 
demand10
 
. Estimation is again by instrumental variables, using lagged variables of all regressors 
as instruments. Data are averaged over five year periods. 
The last column of Table 2 reports the estimated δ for all the selected primary commodities that 
constitute the core of SSA specialization11
                                                 
10 This choice of regressors draws on the work of Debaere and Lee (2003). 
. Cotton and coffee effectively appear not to be 
conducive to growth through their negative effect on terms of trade. Iron ores instead do not seem 
to worsen the terms of trade, therefore their negative effect in the growth regression must be due 
to some other channel (i.e. possible negative spillovers stemming from their 
extraction/production). Interestingly, specialization in sugar also exposes the country to negative 
terms of trade shocks, but this is probably compensated by other possible positive spillovers 
associated with sugar production, since the overall effect on growth is not negative. Oil and cocoa 
11 Again, readers interested in the estimated coefficients on the controls can obtain them from the authors upon 
request. 
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specialization increase the likelihood for the country to experience positive shocks to the terms of 
trade, which is in line with their aggregate positive growth-yield. 
 
To sum-up the evidence in this section, some of the primary commodities on which SSA most 
strongly relies (Cotton and Coffee) are not conducive for growth. This negative effect is likely to 
work through their greater exposure to adverse shocks to terms of trade.  Iron ores also do not 
appear to be conducive to growth, but not because of terms of trade effects. To what extent this 
findings help explain the specificity of the SSA curse detected in Section 2 is however dubious. 
As noted in the previous section, the SSA specificity seems to emerge mostly from fuels and base 
metals. But, with the exception of iron ores, none of the other fuels and metals on which SSA 
heavily specializes appears to be intrinsically bad for growth. On the contrary, oil (but also coal 
and silver) positively affects growth outside SSA. Hence, the pattern of specialization of SSA 
relative to the rest of the world can account for some of the SSA specificity, but the roots of this 
specificity probably lie elsewhere. 
 
3. The interaction between institutions and natural resource in SSA 
 
If institutions are effectively important in determining how natural resources affect the growth 
process, then the explanation of the SSA specify might rest with the institutional 
underdevelopment of SSA relative to the rest of the world.  
 
To substantiate the argument that SSA lags behind the rest of the world in terms of institutional 
development, some quantitative indicator of institutional quality is needed. While many such 
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indicators are available, the institutional dimension that is most relevant in the context of the 
resource curse literature is the quality of the legal arrangements disciplining the activities of the 
private sector and its interactions with the public sector. Based on this interpretation, our proxy of 
institutional development will be the index of quality of the legal system and enforcement of 
property rights available from the Fraser Institute (Fraser Institute, 2006).12
 
 
We start investigating the role of institutions by simply adding institutional quality to regression 
equation (2). Institutional quality is instrumented by its lagged values. Results are reported in 
column I of Table 3. As expected, the coefficient of the institutional variable is positive and 
significant, meaning that better institutions promote growth. However, even after controlling for 
institutional differences, SSA remains characterized by the resource curse while the rest of the 
world does not.  
 
The growing body of research on the political economy of natural resources indicates that the 
effect of resource dependence on growth is conditional on the level of institutional quality. In 
terms of regression analysis, this conditionality requires an extension of the model specification 
to allow for an explicit interaction between institutions and resource dependence. The model with 
interactive terms is therefore written as follows: 
 
                                                 
12 The index ranges from 1(lowest institutional quality) to 10 (highest institutional quality). Its full sample average is 
5.52, with a standard deviation of 1.94. In the sample of SSA observations, however, the average of the index drops 
to 4.15. This compares against an average of 6.11 in the sample of non SSA observations.  Interestingly, there appear 
to be no structural breaks in the institutional quality series for SSA. The index averages 4.07 in the ‘70s, 4.12 in the 
‘80s, 4.21 in the ‘90s and 4.14 in the 2000s. Furthermore, a simple OLS regression of the index of institutional 
quality on the SSA dummy yields a negative estimated coefficient of -1.445 (significant at the 1% level). The 
coefficient of the dummy stays significant even after adding the log of per-capita GDP to the regression. 
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(5)   
ititit
itititititnnitsitit
dSSAqz
dSSAqzdSSAzdSSAzxqxg
εβ
βββαααα
+−+
++−+++++++=
)1(        
)1(....
4
321,,110  
 
where xs are controls, q is an index of institutional quality, and everything else is as in equation 
(2). Note that with specification (5), the marginal effect of natural resources on growth is equal to 
β1+β3q in SSA and to β2+β4q in the rest of the world. So, if β3 is positive, then: (i) institutional 
development (e.g. higher values of q) reduces the extent to which resources are a curse in SSA 
and eventually transforms them into a blessing (resources positively contribute to growth for -β1< 
β3q) and (ii) the difference between SSA and rest of the world vanishes at sufficiently high level 
of institutional quality as long as β3 > β4. 
 
Estimates of equation (5) are reported in column II of Table 3  
 
Table 3: The interactive effect of institutional quality and primary commodities on growth 
 I II III IV 
Lagged income per-capita 
 
-0.012*** -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
Inflation 
 
0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 
Government consumption 
 
-0.078*** -0.062*** -0.102*** -0.107*** 
School enrollment 
 
0.058*** 0.055*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 
Latitude 
 
0.021*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 
Ethnic fragmentation 
 
-0.007* -0.019** -0.014** 0.003 
Trade openness 
 
0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
Institutional quality 
 
0.003** 0.004** 0.002* 0.003** 
Prim commodities*SSA (β1) 
 
-0.006** -0.116***   
Prim commodities*(1-SSA) (β2) 
 
0.000 -0.037*   
Prim commodities * SSA*inst quality (β3) 
 
 0.025***   
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 I II III IV 
Prim commodities*(1-SSA)*inst quality (β4) 
 
 0.010**   
Fuels* SSA 
 
  -0.149***  
Fuels* (1-SSA) 
 
  -0.006  
Fuels* SSA*inst quality 
 
  0.039**  
Fuels * (1-SSA)*inst quality 
 
  0.002  
Ores and metals * SSA 
 
   -0.117*** 
Ores and metals *(1-SSA) 
 
   -0.043 
Ores and metals * SSA*inst quality 
 
   0.011* 
Ores and metals*(1-SSA)*inst quality 
 
   0.008 
     
Number of observations 
 
223 223 223 223 
Sargan test 
 
1.50 2.36 3.19 2.92 
Notes: SSA denotes the dummy variable taking value 1 for Sub-Saharan Countries. For full description of variables see Appendix. 
Time dummies and constant not reported. The raw Sargan test reports the J-statistic for the test of over-identifying restrictions. *, **, 
*** respectively denote significance of coefficients at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of confidence. 
 
The interactive terms between primary commodities and institutions (β3 and β4) are positive and 
statistically significant, meaning that better institutions make resources more conducive to 
growth. Moreover, the coefficient of the interactive term is higher for SSA than for the rest of the 
world. This implies that institutional development eventually makes the SSA specificity vanish.  
 
Figure 1 can be helpful in understanding what the estimated coefficients in column 2 imply. The 
figure plots ∂g/∂z for the two groups SSA and ROW based on the estimated coefficients reported 
in column 2. As it can be seen, at low levels of institutional quality, the marginal effect of 
resources on growth is negative in both groups, but sharply more so in SSA.  As institutions 
improve, the effect turns from negative to positive. For the average ROW country, the marginal 
effect of resources on growth is already positive for a level of institutional quality of 3.7. In SSA, 
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instead, for resources to become a blessing a higher level of institutional quality (4.55 and above) 
is required.  However, when institutions are of a very good quality, resources are more of a 
blessing in SSA than elsewhere. This is an interesting result that, to some extent, might depend 
on the fact that we are estimating a linear coefficient on the interactive term. Nevertheless, the 
possibility that SSA benefits more than other countries from institutional development is an 
intriguing finding that deserves consideration in future analysis. 
 
Figure 1 
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Institutional quality 
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The two remaining columns of Table 3 re-estimate equation (5) using dependence on fuels 
(column III) and dependence on ores and metals (column IV) instead of the overall index of 
dependence on primary commodities. As it will be recalled from section 2, much of the negative 
growth-effect of resources in SSA is driven by these two categories of commodities. The 
estimates confirm the findings from column II: both fuels and ores and metals are a curse at low 
levels of institutional quality in SSA much more than in the rest of the world. However, the 
improvement in institutions turns resources from a curse into a blessing. 
 
4. Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this section we study how robust previous results are to different methodological choices.13
 
  
4.1 Choice of instruments  
 
Perhaps, the most critical methodological choice we have made concerns the identification 
strategy; that is, the use of lagged values as instruments for potential endogenous regressors in 
the growth equation. This strategy has been largely used in the growth empirical literature and, in 
the specific context of our paper, it is to some extent validated by the statistics of the Sargan test 
reported at the bottom of tables 1 and 3 as well as the first stage diagnostics discussed in the 
appendix . Nevertheless, one would also like to see whether results change when lagged variables 
                                                 
13 To save space, we do not report all of the robustness results in detail. All of them can be obtained from the authors 
upon request. 
 
 21 
are replaced by other instruments. To this purpose we re-estimate equations (2) and (5) using the 
following instruments: 
 
• The rate of inflation is instrumented by the type of exchange rate regime and the degree of 
independence of the Central Bank. Carmignani et al. (2008) show that these economic 
institutions effectively determine monetary outcomes, while the evidence of reverse 
causality is more ambiguous.  
• Government consumption is instrumented by a dummy variable for non-proportional 
electoral rules and a dummy variable for presidential regimes. Persson and Tabellini 
(2003) show that constitutional arrangements of this type are indeed important 
determinants of fiscal policy outcomes. At the same time, constitutional arrangements are 
rather stable over time and therefore unlikely to be determined by changes in fiscal policy. 
• School enrolment is instrumented by the incidence of natural disasters. Toya et al. (2010) 
present a model where the rate of accumulation of human (as well as physical capital) is 
determined by natural disasters. Their econometric evidence effectively suggests that 
natural disasters perform well as an instrument for a variety of measures of schooling. 
• Trade openness is instrumented by the log-area of a country, a dummy for landlocked 
countries, and the number of free trade agreements in which each country participates. 
The use of geographical variables as instruments of trade goes back to Frankel and Romer 
(1999). We add the number of free trade agreements as a rather crude proxy of the attempt 
of a country to undertake liberalization policies that should promote international trade. 
• Institutions are instrumented by the settler’s mortality rate, following a well known 
argument of Acemoglu et al (2001). The legal origin dummies that are already included as 
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instruments in the regressions of tables 2 and 4 also work well as instruments for 
institutional quality (on this point, see La Porta et al., 1999) 
• Resource dependence is instrumented by the proportion of country land at the tropics and 
country distance from the sea or a major river. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008 and 2009) 
use these two variables as instruments for resource dependence together with a dummy 
for presidential regimes, which however we already use as instrument for government 
consumption. Their results also indicate that natural capital (see subsection 5.3) might 
also be an instrument of resource dependence, even though we cannot exclude that it is 
correlated with growth over and above any effect it might have on resource dependence.  
• Finally, we also include as instruments a few interactive terms: (i) proportion of land at 
the tropics and settler’s mortality, (ii) country distance from sea/river and settler’s 
mortality, (iii) proportion of land at the tropics and dummy for SSA, and (iv) proportion 
of land at the tropics and dummy for non SSA.  These additional instruments are meant to 
be used in associated with the inclusion of interactive terms in the growth regression. 
Results are reported in columns I and II of Table 4. The last row of the table reports the statistic 
of the Sargan test (the null hypothesis can never be rejected at usual confidence levels). First 
stage diagnostics are reported in the Appendix. As it can be seen, results are very much in line 
with those discussed in the previous sections. In other words, the evidence concerning the role of 
primary commodities and its interaction with institutional development is robust to changes in the 
identification strategy. 
 
 
 
 23 
4.2 Level effects and GMM estimator 
 
Recent empirical work on the determinants of long-term development uses the level of per-capita 
GDP (rather than its growth rate) as the dependent variable (see for instance, Acemoglu et al. 
2001, Nunn 2008, Bhattacharyya, 2009 and Alexeev and Conrad, 2009). In fact, a growth 
regression can be easily transformed into a regression of current per-capita income on its lagged 
values and a set of controls. This transformed regression can then be estimated using a dynamic 
panel GMM estimator (see Arellano and Bond, 1991 and Caselli et al. 1996) that involves (i) 
first-differencing the transformed growth regression to eliminate individual effects and (ii) 
instrumenting first-differences by all the lagged values of the regressors.  This estimator therefore 
offers another possible way to address the inconsistency arising from the endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. 
 
GMM estimates of equation (2) and (5) are reported in columns III and IV of Table 4. Because 
the first-step of the procedure involves taking first-differences, latitude and ethnic 
fractionalisation have to be removed as they are fixed effects over time. Nevertheless, the GMM 
estimates are again very similar to those reported in tables 1 and 3, thus providing further 
evidence of the robustness of our results. 
 
We also estimate a very parsimonious, non-dynamic, specification of the regression in level 
including only latitude, ethnic fractionalisation, and institutional quality as controls (see Alexeev 
and Conrad, 2009 for a discussion of this parsimonious specification). We use 2SLS and 
instrumented institutional quality by the settler’s mortality rate and the legal origin dummies. 
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Resource dependence are instrumented by the proportion of land within the tropics and distance 
from sea/river. Results (not reported in the table, but available upon request) are highly consistent 
with those discussed so far. Latitude and institutional quality are positive and significant, while 
ethnic fractionalisation is negative and significant. The coefficient on resource dependence is 
negative and significant in SSA and non-significant in the rest of the world. The interactive term 
between resource dependence and institutions is positive and significant in both groups. The 
estimated coefficients imply that resources become a blessing in SSA for a level of institutional 
quality above 4.82.  
 
4.3 Specification of the set of control variables 
 
We expand the set of control variables to include an index of capital account liberalization, 
budget deficit, and domestic credit to the private sector in percent of GDP. None of these 
additional controls turns out to be statistically significant while the results concerning the role of 
primary commodities are practically unchanged. We also add fixed capital formation in percent 
of GDP as a proxy for the investment in physical capital. Again, the estimated coefficient on this 
variable is largely insignificant, thus suggesting that the other variables of the model already fully 
explain how investment influences growth.  
 
Perhaps, a more interesting robustness test is suggested by the findings recently reported by 
Bhattacharyya (2009). He shows that malaria incidence is the main determinant of income and 
growth in Africa. We therefore re-estimate our equations (2) and (5) including this variable. 
Results are shown in column V and VI of Table 4. The instruments are the same as in columns I 
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and II of the table. Malaria is instrumented using an index of malaria ecology plus three climatic 
variables: rain, humidity, and frost.  
 
The addition of the malaria variable makes latitude statistically insignificant. This is probably to 
be expected given that malaria tends to be more endemic in areas that are closer to the equator. 
There is therefore a strong collinearity between malaria incidence and latitude. However, all of 
the other results are, once again, confirmed. 
  
4.4 Resource dependence vs. resource abundance 
 
As noted in Section 2, the recent literature on the economics of natural resources distinguish 
between resource dependence and resource abundance. The measure of natural resources that we 
have adopted so far (total exports of primary commodities in percent of total merchandise 
exports) is a measure of dependence. Our last robustness check is therefore to use a measure of 
resource abundance in our growth regressions.  
 
Following Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) we take the World Bank data on natural capital as a 
proxy for resource abundance. These data are available for a smaller sample of countries and for 
the reference year 1994. Estimation is therefore based on a cross-section of 81 countries, of 
which 31 are SSA economies. Inflation, government consumption, school enrolment, trade 
openness, and institutional quality are all measured as averages over the entire sample period 
(1975-2004) and instrumented with the alternative instruments introduced in subsection 5.1.  
Lagged per-capita GDP is measured as the level of per-capita GDP in 1975. Brunnschweiler and 
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Bulte (2008) argue that natural capital, even if measured in 1994, is exogenous to the growth 
process and it can be instrumented by itself. In fact, we tried two alternatives: one with natural 
capital treated as exogenous and the other with natural capital instrumented by share of country 
land at the tropics and distance from river/sea. Results are virtually the same. We therefore report 
only those where natural capital is exogenous. 
 
Results are shown in columns VII and VIII of table 4. The use of natural capital seems to make 
the difference between SSA and rest of the world even sharper. In column VII resource 
abundance is found to increase growth in the rest of the world while decreasing growth in SSA. 
Similarly, in column VIII, resource abundance is not significantly negative for growth in the rest 
of the world even at very low level of institutional quality. On the contrary, in SSA resources 
remain a curse as long as institutions are of a sufficiently low quality. All in all, our basic story 
on the SSA specificity relative to the rest of the world is confirmed.  
 
Table 4: Robustness analysis 
 I 
(2SLS) 
II 
(2SLS) 
III  
(GMM) 
IV 
(GMM) 
V 
(2SLS) 
 
VI 
(2SLS) 
VII 
(IV) 
VIII 
(IV) 
Lagged income p.c. 
 
-0.008*** -0.019*** 0.603*** 0.757*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.002** -0.004** 
Inflation 
 
-0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.002** -0.005* 
Government cons. 
 
-0.067*** -0.78*** -0.257 -0.305** -0.064** -0.116** -0.066** -0.071*** 
School enrolment 
 
0.049** 0.072*** 0.237** 0.264* 0.028** 0.067** 0.052** 0.055*** 
Latitude 
 
0.033*** 0.031*** .. .. 0.001 0.002 0.038** 0.035*** 
Ethnic fragmentation 
 
-0.005** -0.007** .. .. -0.007** -0.002** 0.001** -0.006** 
Trade openness 
 
0.022*** 0.025*** 0.352*** 0.254*** 0.023*** 0.028** 0.021** 0.028*** 
Malaria incidence 
 
.. .. .. .. -0.095** -0.104***   
Institutional quality .. 0.004** .. 0.102** .. 0.007**  0.011*** 
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 I 
(2SLS) 
II 
(2SLS) 
III  
(GMM) 
IV 
(GMM) 
V 
(2SLS) 
 
VI 
(2SLS) 
VII 
(IV) 
VIII 
(IV) 
 
Prim_comm*SSA 
 
-0.022** -0.132*** -1.612*** -5.287*** -0.032*** -0.118*** -0.014** -0.129** 
Prim_comm*(1-SSA) 
 
-0.002 -0.022* -0.257 -1.049* -0.001 -0.021* 0.019** -0.033 
Prim_comm * SSA*inst.  
quality 
.. 0.027*** .. 0.251** .. 0.030*** .. -0.032*** 
Prim_comm*(1-SSA)*inst 
quality 
.. 0.007** .. 0.059** .. 0.008** .. 0.004* 
 
N. obs 
252 231 174 172 238 219 81 81 
Test  of overidentfying 
restrictions 
 
6.49 6.82 12.35 11.46 5.32 7.01 3.78 2.91 
Notes: Estimators are as follows. Columns I and II:2SLS with alternative instruments. Columns III and IV: regression in levels estimated by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator. Columns V and VI: 2SLS with alternative instruments and malaria incidence as regressor 
(instrumented by malaria ecology from Kiszewski et al. 2004 and rain, humidity and frost indicators from Masters and McMillan (2001) and 
Nunn (2008). Columns VII and VIII: 2SLS estimated with alternative instruments and resource abundance. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The econometric analysis in this paper has uncovered some interesting results. While there is no 
evidence of a generalized curse at the global level, it appears that primary commodities 
negatively affect economic growth in SSA. One might think that this specificity arises from the 
fact that SSA specializes on commodities that are not conducive for growth. In fact, only few of 
the primary commodities that characterize the production structure of the SSA are intrinsically 
bad for growth. This finding generalizes the argument of Deaton (1999): while adverse price 
dynamics of some commodities (like cotton and coffee) do not help, the root cause of slow 
African development resides elsewhere. The key to understanding the SSA specificity seems to 
lie in the interaction between institutions and natural resources. When we extend our model to 
account for this interaction we find that (i) the African specificity exists only at low levels of 
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institutional development and (ii) as institutions improve, resources turn from a curse into a 
blessing, especially in SSA. 
 
A number of avenues for future research can be pointed out. One interesting area to pursue is the 
extension of the analysis to other measures of economic development and/or macroeconomic 
performance. For instance, output growth volatility is an important factor influencing people’s 
welfare and long-term growth prospects. The question is then to see how resources dependence 
affects volatility and growth simultaneously. A second possible direction of research should 
focus on sub-regional effects. SSA is a broad continent covering several sub-regions at different 
state of economic and institutional development. These sub-regions are also different in terms of 
their degree of integration and policy coordination. The issue is then to model the primary 
commodity-growth relationship allowing for differences across sub-regions in SSA. This will of 
course require some considerable efforts in data collection, since at the present stage, the number 
of observations available for most sub-regions would not be enough to allow the estimation of a 
growth model of the type used in this paper. 
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Appendix A: Relevance of instruments 
 
Valid instruments need to be (i) significantly correlated with the exogenous regressor (relevance 
of the instrument) and (ii) exogenous to the error term (validity of the instrument).  
 
When the number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous regressor (e.g. when the 
model is over-identified), then validity can be tested using the test of overidentfying restrictions, 
whose statistics is reported at the bottom of tables 1, 3, and 4.   
 
Relevance is instead assessed from the goodness of fit of the first stage regression. However, the 
standard R2 and F-test of the joint significance of all instruments are not particularly useful in this 
context: high values of the R2 and F-statistic in the first stage regression do not necessarily imply 
that instruments are relevant (see Nelson and Startz, 1990). Two more informative statistics are 
the standard partial R2 (Bound et al. 1995) and Shea’s partial R2 (Shea, 1997), which are 
computed by partialling-out the “included” instruments (that is, the instruments that are also 
included as exogenous explanatory variables in the original regression). The interpretation of 
these two statistics is however limited by two factors: (i) the standard partial R2 is reliable if there 
is only one endogenous variable per equation (and this is the case only in equation (3)); (ii) 
Shea’s partial R2 is designed to account for multiple endogenous regressors, but its distribution 
has not been derived, and hence no formal test of significance can be conducted. Baum et al. 
(2003), however, propose a helpful rule of thumb: if the standard partial R2 is high and the Shea’s 
partial R2 is low, then instruments probably lack sufficient relevance.  
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Table 5 reports the three statistics computed from the first stage regression of the estimates 
presented in column II of Table 3 and in column II of table 4. The statistics are: the standard 
partial R2, the F-statistic of the test of joint significance of the excluded instruments (and the 
associated p-value in bracket), and the Shea’s partial R2. The F-test suggest that the standard 
partial R2 are high enough, while the Shea partial R2 are not too smaller than the standard partial 
R2. We take this as evidence in support of our identification strategies. 
 
Table 5. First stage statistics 
 Partial R2 F-stat Shea partial R2 
Instrumented by lagged values    
Inflation 0.25 15.87   (0.001) 0.15 
Government consumption 0.75 136.48 (0.000) 0.47 
School enrolment 0.59 102.39 (0.000) 0.39 
Trade openness 0.71 125.23 (0.000) 0.53 
Institutional quality 0.78 142.74 (0.000) 0.58 
Primary commodities*SSA 0.76 138.98 (0.000) 0.55 
Primary commodities*(1-SSA) 0.75 137.83 (0.000) 0.54 
Prim commodities*SSA*inst quality 0.77 140.22 (0.000) 0.51 
Prim commodities*(1-SSA)*inst 
quality 
0.77 139.41 (0.000) 0.52 
    
    
Instrumented by other 
instruments 
   
Inflation 0.23 7.87 (0.000) 0.18 
Government consumption 0.28 8.95 (0.000) 0.22 
School enrolment 0.21 7.71 (0.000) 0.17 
Trade openness 0.19 5.99 (0.001) 0.16 
Institutional quality 0.34 9.94 (0.000) 0.29 
Primary commodities*SSA 0.27 8.87 (0.000) 0.24 
Primary commodities*(1-SSA) 0.29 9.02 (0.000) 0.25 
Prim commodities*SSA*inst quality 0.30 9.17 (0.000) 0.25 
Prim commodities*(1-SSA)*inst 
quality 
0.31 9.46 (0.000) 0.26 
    
Tests for lagged variables refer to the estimates of model II of table 3. Tests for the other instruments refer to model 
II of table 4. First stage statistics for all other models are available upon request.  
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Appendix B: Variables description and data sources 
Variable 
namea  
 
Description Sourceb 
Growth per-
capita GDP 
 
Annual percent change in constant prices per-capita GDP WDI 
Lagged per-
capita GDP 
 
One period lagged value of log per-capita GDP (constant 
prices) 
WDI 
Inflation 
 
Average annual rate of change of consumer price index WDI 
Government 
consumption 
 
Final government consumption expenditure in percent of 
GDP 
WDI 
School 
enrollment 
 
Net secondary schooling enrollment rate WDI 
Latitude Absolute latitude La Porta et 
al (1999) 
 
Ethnic 
fragmentation 
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation La Porta et 
al (1999) 
 
Trade 
openness 
 
Total exports plus total imports in percent of GDP WDI 
Primary 
commodities 
Exports of primary commodities in percent of total 
exports. Primary commodities include food and live 
animals, beverages and tobacco, animal and vegetable oils 
and waxes, excluding manufactured goods; crude 
materials, mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials; 
non ferrous metals, metalliferous ores and scrap, crude 
fertilizers 
 
WDI 
Agricultural 
materials 
Exports of agricultural raw materials in percent of total 
exports. Agricultural raw materials include SITC section 2 
excluding divisions 22, 27 and 28 
 
WDI 
Food Exports of food and bevarges in percent of total exports. 
Food and beverages include SITC 0, 1, 4, and 22 
 
WDI 
Fuels Exports of mineral fuels in percent of total exports. Fuels WDI 
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include SITC 3 
 
Ores and 
metals 
Exports of ores and metals in percent of total exports. 
Ores and metals include SITC 27, 28, 68. 
 
WDI 
Oil Exports of oil in percent of total exports. Oil is SITC 333 
 
UNCTAD 
Cocoa Exports of cocoa in percent of total exports. Oil is SITC 
072 
 
UNCTAD 
Cotton Exports of cotton in percent of total exports. Oil is SITC 
263 
 
UNCTAD 
Coffee Exports of coffee in percent of total exports. Coffee is 
SITC 071  
 
UNCTAD 
Fruits and 
nuts 
Exports of fruits and nuts in percent of total exports. Fruits 
and nuts are SITC 057 
 
UNCTAD 
Sugar Exports of sugar in percent of total exports. Sugar is SITC 
061 
 
UNCTAD 
Silver Exports of silver in % of total exports. Silver is SITC 681 
 
UNCTAD 
Iron ores Exports of iron ores in percent of total exports. Iron ores is 
SITC 281 
 
UNCTAD 
Coal Exports of coal in percent of total exports. Coal is SITC 
322 
 
UNCTAD 
Copper Exports of copper in percent of total exports. Copper is 
SITC 682 
 
UNCTAD 
Aluminum Exports of aluminum in percent of total exports. 
Aluminum is SITC 684 
 
UNCTAD 
Institutional 
quality 
Index of legal structure and property rights (Area 2 of the 
Economic Freedom Index) 
 
Fraser 
Institute 
Terms of 
trade growth 
 
Annual percent change in net barter terms of trade WDI 
Capital 
formation 
Gross capital formation (addition to fixed assets plus net 
changes in inventory) in percent of GDP 
 
WDI 
World growth Annual percent change of constant prices per-capita GDP WDI 
 33 
for the world aggregate 
 
Financial 
intermediation 
Monetary aggregate M2 (money and quasi-money) in 
percent of GDP 
 
WDI 
Financial 
openness 
Index of capital account liberalization Fraser 
Institute 
 
Time 
dummies 
Dummy 80 = 1 for years in the ‘80s and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 90 = 1 for years in the ‘90s and 0 otherwise 
 
 
Legal 
dummies 
Dummy UK = 1 if legal origins are Anglo-Saxon 
Dummy FR = 1 if legal origins are French 
Dummy SC = 1 if legal origins are Scandinavian 
Dummy GE = 1 if legal origins are German 
 
La Porta et 
al. (1999) 
SSA Dummy variable taking value 1 for African countries  
   
Natural 
capital 
Alternaitve measure of resource abundance defined as the 
the (log) of total natural capital and mineral resource 
assets in dollars per capita  
World 
Bank 
   
Malaria 
incidence 
Proprotion of total population living in endemic malaria 
zones 
 
CID 
Other instruments for the regressions in table 4 
   
Exchange rate 
regime 
Categorical variable taking value from 1 to 5, where 1 
indicates an extreme peg and 5 a freely falling regime. 
Rehinart et 
al. 
   
Central bank 
independence 
Average turnover of the central banker Ghosh et 
al. 
   
Electoral rule Dummy variable taking value in countries that adopt a 
plurality rule 
DPI 
   
Presidential 
regime 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the country is a 
presidential regime 
DPI 
   
Natural 
disasters 
Total number of significant disasters normalized by land 
size 
CRED 
   
Area Log of land area (in kmq) WDI 
   
Landlocked Dummy variable taking value 1 if the country has no 
direct access to the sea 
CIA 
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FTA 
participation 
Number of free trade agreements and other trade 
facilitation agreements in which a country participates 
WTO 
   
Distance from 
sea/river 
Log of distance (in Km) of capital city from the nearest 
coast or river 
CIA and 
Nunn 
   
Proportion of 
land in tropics 
Proportion of total country land included within the two 
tropics 
Author’s 
calculation 
from CIA 
   
Settlers 
mortality 
Log  of European settlers’ mortality rate Acemoglu 
   
Malaria 
Ecology 
Ecologically based spatial index defined from climatic 
factors and biological properties of each regionally 
dominant malaria vectors (see original reference for 
further details) 
Kiszewski 
   
Rain Minimum of monthly average rainfall Nunn 
   
Humidity Minimum of monthly average humidity (in percent) Nunn 
   
Frost Seasonal frost: number of days with below-freezing 
ground temperatures in a winter season that follows a 
frost-free summer 
Masters 
   
   
a Variable name as it appears in the tables and/or in the text 
bDetailed references for the sources are as follows: 
WDI:   World Bank (various issues) World Development Indicators, Washington D.C. 
UNCTAD United Nations Conferences on Trade and Development (various issues) Handbook of Statistics, 
Geneva.  
Fraser Inst. Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report 2006; Edited by: J. Gwartney and 
R. Lawson with W. Easterly, Vancouver. 
La Porta et al La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., and Vishny R. (1999). The Quality of Government. 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 15, 222-279. 
Reinhart et al. Reinhart, C, Rogoff, K. (2004) The Modern history of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A 
reinterpretation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 1-48.  
 Ilzetski, E. Rehinart, C., Rogoff, K., Exchange rate arrangements entering the 21st century: which 
anchor will hold? http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar/Papers.html 
Ghosh et al. Ghosh, A., Gulde, A., Wolf, H. (2002) Exchange rate regimes, choices and consequences, MIT 
Press 
DPI Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., Walsh, P. (2001) “New tools in comparative political 
economy: the database of politica institutions”, World Bank Economic Review 15, 165-176 
http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40 
CRED Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters http://www.cred.be/ 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/ 
WTO World Trade Organization http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/Statis_e.htm 
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Acemoglou  Acemoglu, D, Johnson, S., Robinson, J. (2001) “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development : An Empirical Investigation” American Economic Review, 91, 1369-401. 
World Bank World Bank (1997) Expanding the measure of wealth: indicators of environmentally sustainable 
development. Environmentally Sustainable Development Studies and Monographs Series No. 17, 
1997. And World Bank (2006) Where is the Wealth of Nations? Measuring capital for the XXI 
century. Washington D.C.  
Kiszewski Kiszewski, A., A.Mellinger, A. Spielman, P. Malaney, S. Sachs and J Sachs (2004) ‘A Global 
Index Representing the Stability of Malaria Transmission’, American Journal of Tropical Medicine 
and Hygiene, 70, 486–98. 
Masters Masters, W. and M. McMillan (2001) ‘Climate and Scale in Economic Growth’, Journal of 
Economic Growth, 6 (3): 167–186. 
Nunn Nunn, N. (2008) ‘The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 123 (1): 139–176. 
CID Centre for International Development at Harvard University 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html 
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